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I. INTRODUCTION
Why would a God concerned about justice in a matter of life and death be willing to
delegate an absolute power over life and death to such fallible and morally be-
nighted creatures?'
In the landmark Furman v. Georgia decision, 2 Justice Bren-
nan likened capital punishment to a mere game of chance: "When
the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases
in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescap-
able that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little
more than a lottery system."3 Although Brennan's argument in
Furman focused primarily on disparities across racial lines in death
penalty implementation, 4 the notion of arbitrariness 5 applies
1. LLOYD STEFFEN, EXECUTING JUSTICE: THE MORAL MEANING OF THE DEATH PENALTY
154 (1998).
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
3. Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). This Note addresses a "lottery system" in capital
punishment jury deliberations, which is somewhat different than the system portrayed by Jus-
tice Brennan. Id. Whereas Brennan focused on the sentencing process as racially unbalanced in
its outcomes, this Note examines the possibility of extraneous material, and particularly reli-
gious discussion as such extraneous material, invalidating the necessary fairness of death pen-
alty deliberation. To expand upon Brennan's vernacular, religious discussion as an extraneous
material may increase (or perhaps decrease, in certain instances) the odds of a jury sentencing a
defendant to die. Id. Whatever a jury's ultimate decision may be, religious discussion has a sub-
stantially high potential to divert the jurors' attention from truly relevant considerations during
the sentencing phase. See infra Part IV.
4. 408 U.S. at 238. The Court's split in Furman was particularly interesting given the
enormity of the issue. As evidenced by the language used in the various opinions, there was no
love lost amongst the Justices. For instance, Justice Douglas described the arbitrary nature of
death penalty deliberation by declaring that "[pleople live or die, dependent on the whim of one
man [when a judge sentences] or of 12 [when a jury sentences]." Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added). Brennan and Marshall both expressly contended that capital punish-
ment was per se unconstitutional, notwithstanding the possibility of detailed guidelines concern-
ing its administration. Id.
In dissent, however, Justice Powell focused on the extensive consequences of the per curiam
decision, calling it a "grave event for the Court to take from the States whatever deterrent and
retributive weight the death penalty retains." Id. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Burger countered the plurality's contention that juries arbitrarily sentence defendants to the
death penalty by arguing that the "very infrequency of death penalties imposed by jurors attests
their cautious and discriminating reservation of that penalty for the most extreme cases." Id. at
402 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Furman invalidated the death penalty statutes of both Georgia and Texas (from which the
three consolidated cases arose), yet, by implication, reached far beyond those two states. See, e.g.,
GREGORY D. RUSSELL, THE DEATH PENALTY AND RACIAL BIAS: OVERTURNING SUPREME COURT
ASSUMPTIONS 17-20 (1994). The decision also effectively overturned all state death penalty stat-
utes that granted juries unlimited sentencing discretion. See id. at 17. States responded to
Furman almost instantaneously by passing new statutes that provided the sentencing authority,
whether judge or jury, with more detailed guidelines for imposing the death penalty. See id. at
19-20; see also BARRY LATZER, DEATH PENALTY CASES: LEADING U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES ON
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equally well to our knowledge of the processes, discussions, and
maneuvers that take place behind the closed doors of many capital
punishment jury rooms.6 It is practically impossible, and indeed
explicitly prohibited by the Rules of Evidence, 7 to delve into jurors'
thoughts and considerations pertaining to a particular sentencing
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 45 (1998) (noting that thirty-five states rewrote death penalty statutes in
an effort to conform to the Court's guidelines, "if anyone could determine what they were," fol-
lowing the confusing per curiam decision in Furman).
5. See, e.g., Louis J. PALMER, JR., THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS 146 (1998) (using the term "arbitrariness" to encom-
pass both passion and prejudice, and explaining that judicial review for arbitrariness "is largely
dependent upon the capital felon making an allegation that a specific arbitrary factor influenced
the decision in the case"). But see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961) (describing the
presumption of impartiality on the part of jurors); Wells v. Murray, 831 F.2d 468, 472 (4th Cir.
1987) ("Jurors ... are presumed to be impartial . .. ."). This Note, in part, questions whether
such presumptions of impartiality should extend to the delicate relationship between religion
and the death penalty, particularly when the relationship arises in countless jury deliberations
during the sentencing phase. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck?: Juror Mispercep-
tion of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1154 (1995) (dictat-
ing interviews with jurors in completed capital punishment cases, as part of the Capital Jury
Project, in which one juror said that "there were three occasions that the jury, as a group, prayed
together," that "all fifteen of us Uurors] felt the need to [pray together]," and that "I believe that
I, as well as the other jurors, were guided, that God guided us to the decision that we made").
6. Individual states must ensure that death penalty procedures comply with the Supreme
Court's mandate that statutes must "channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective
standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that 'make rationally reviewable the
process for imposing a sentence of death.'" Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303
(1976)). In practice, however, state death penalty procedures frequently fall short of meeting this
requirement. See infra Part V.
7. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits substantive post-deliberation inquiry into ju-
rors' thoughts and emotions as developed during trial. The rule reads as follows:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or in-
dictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith,
except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any out-
side influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's
affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about
which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these pur-
poses.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
Although courts once limited application of the Federal Rules of Evidence to the trial phase,
the current trend favors extending the application of Rule 606(b) to sentencing hearings as well.
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 246 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining that "the reasons
[underlying Rule 606(b)] ... apply with equal force to sentencing hearings" (citing Silagy v. Pe-
ters, 905 F.2d 986, 1009 (7th Cir. 1990) (barring use of jurors' statements in habeas corpus pro-
ceeding as means to impeach jury's sentencing determination))); see also infra Part III.
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decision.8 This limitation assumes heightened significance when a
jury delivers a death penalty sentence, 9 given that it is the "ulti-
mate punishment" 10 and cannot be corrected after implementa-
tion."1
The trial of Kevin Young12 stands as one of many that illus-
trate the dangers 3 inherent in erecting impenetrable barriers
8. See, e.g., McDowell v. Calderon, 107 F.3d 1351, 1367 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a ju-
ror's post-deliberation statement concerning his personal belief about the death penalty and his
reasons for voting in favor of its implementation is inadmissible under Rule 606(b)).
9. The statutory basis for the federal death penalty, which is typically mirrored by state
death penalty statutes, resides in the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598
(1994). Section 3591(a) establishes the criteria for determining which crimes may subject a de-
fendant to the death penalty. Section 3592 enumerates mitigating and aggravating factors that
juries should consider in determining whether a sentence of death is warranted. Mitigating fac-
tors include such elements as a defendant's impaired capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his or her conduct, duress, and the lack of a prior criminal record. § 3592(1)-(7). Aggravating
factors include such elements as a defendant's previous convictions for other serious offenses, the
level of risk of death to others, pecuniary gain, and the vulnerability of the victim. § 3592(4)-(6),
(8), (11). Section 3593 explains the requisite procedural safeguards in relation to prosecutorial
pursuit of the death penalty. Acknowledging the need for parameters on the jury's discretion, §
3593 specifically dictates that "the court.., shall instruct the jury that, in considering whether a
sentence of death is justified, it shall not consider the race, color, religious beliefs, national ori-
gin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim and that the jury is not to recommend a sentence of
death unless it has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of death for the crime in ques-
tion no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of
any victim may be." § 3593(f) (emphasis added).
Section 3595 describes the appellate process in death penalty sentencing. Dur-
ing review, [wihenever the court of appeals finds that-(A) the sentence of
death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbi-
trary factor; (B) the admissible evidence and information adduced does not sup-
port the special finding of the existence of the required aggravating factor; or
(C) the proceedings involved any other legal error requiring reversal of the sen-
tence that was properly preserved for appeal . .. , the court shall remand the
case for reconsideration under section 3593 or imposition of a sentence other
than death.
§ 3595(c)(2)(A)-(C). If the prosecution "establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that [an) error was
harmless," however, the court of appeals cannot reverse or vacate a death penalty sentence. §
3595(c)(2).
10. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 71 (1997).
11. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182 (Stewart, J.) (describing the death penalty as the "most
irrevocable of sanctions"). For a brief history of the death penalty in the United States, see THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 3-25 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) (di-
viding the history of the death penalty into a series of six epochs from the colonial period to the
present, and noting the increased "[ploliticization of the death penalty" during the most recent
epoch, spanning from 1976 to the present) [hereinafter THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA].
12. Young v. State, 12 P.3d 20, 29 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
13. Arbitrary imposition of the death penalty lies at the forefront of the many dangers lurk-
ing in modern capital punishment deliberations. See, e.g., ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A
WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 149 (1996) (questioning whether even-handed and nondiscriminatory
administration of the death penalty is even possible).
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around capital punishment jury deliberations. 14 In 1997, Young
faced a jury trial in the District Court of Oklahoma County, 5 in
which the jury sentenced Young to the death penalty for the charge
of murder in the first degree, to twenty years imprisonment for at-
tempted robbery with a firearm, and to thirty years imprisonment
for shooting with intent to kill.
16
Following the sentencing, Young's attorney filed an "Applica-
tion for Evidentiary Hearing on Extraneous Information Relied
Upon By the Jury"17 with the Court of Criminal Appeals of Okla-
homa.'8 Young's counsel alleged that several jurors incorporated at
least one Bible into the sentencing deliberations and, as a result,
prejudicially influenced the jury as a whole. 19 The Court of Criminal
Appeals remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether one or more jurors physically brought
extraneous material, specifically a Bible, into the deliberation room,
and if so, whether jurors incorporated that extraneous material into
their sentencing deliberations. 20 The trial judge found that one ju-
ror "may or may not have had a New Testament inside his brief case
during the second stage of trial."21
14. See, e.g., Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 514
(1988) (arguing that one of the implications of Rule 606(b) is that meaningful inquiry into jury
misconduct may be curtailed, by necessity and without sufficient justification, at the jury room
door).
15. Young, 12 P.3d at 29. Young, along with another suspect, had allegedly entered a "gam-
bling operation" located in the back of an Oklahoma City restaurant and proclaimed, "[wie come
[sic] for the money," while brandishing a gun. Id. A shootout ensued, during which time Young
allegedly shot the victim, Sutton, four times. Id. Sutton died as a result of a gunshot wound to
the abdomen. Id. Police later found Young seeking medical treatment for his own gunshot
wounds at a hospital in close proximity to the scene of the crime, and placed him under arrest.
Id. at 30.
16. Id. at 29.
17. Id. at 47. The Application requested an evidentiary hearing in accordance with Title 22,
Chapter 18, Rule 3.11(A) of the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which reads:
After the Petition in Error has been timely filed in this Court, and upon notice
from either party or upon this Court's own motion, the majority of the Court
may, within its discretion, direct a supplementation of the record, when neces-
sary, for a determination of any issue; or, when necessary, may direct the trial
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue.
OKLA. R. CT. CRIM. App. 3.11(A) (1999).
18. Young, 12 P.3d at 47.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing Order Granting Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Extraneous Informa-
tion Considered by the Jury During Appellant's Sentencing Trial and Order Setting Due Dates
for Record and Additional Briefing Schedule (Ok. Cr. Jan. 14, 2000) (F 98-703) (not for publica-
tion)).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
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The court's uncertainty was due to inconsistencies in the tes-
timony of a single juror discovered during the evidentiary hearing.
22
In interviews with an investigator acting on Young's behalf, this
juror contended that the jury foreperson brought a Bible into the
jury room during the sentencing phase and, along with another ju-
ror, read verses from Psalms. 23 In addition, the juror stated that
she had been considering voting for lifetime imprisonment without
parole, but fellow jurors swayed her to vote for a death sentence
after reading aloud verses from Romans during the sentencing de-
liberations. 24 At the evidentiary hearing, however, the juror contra-
dicted her previous statement to the investigator and instead testi-
fied that she had read the passages from Romans alone at night
during the voir dire process and that her fellow jurors did not actu-
ally read the Bible in the jury room. 25 The apparent inconsistencies,
taken in context with other testimony presented at the evidentiary
hearing, prompted the trial judge to conclude that there was no
credible evidence that a juror either brought or used a Bible in the
jury room during the sentencing deliberations.
26
Referring to the trial judge's findings as "clearly erroneous
and/or unreasonable," 27 Young's counsel implored the Court of
Criminal Appeals to review the evidentiary hearing record de novo
to determine whether jurors incorporated a Bible into their sentenc-
ing deliberations. 28 The Court of Criminal Appeals refused this re-
quest and, conversely, applied only a "deferential abuse of discre-
tion" standard of review to the trial court's findings. 29 Thus, the ap-
peals court upheld the trial judge's findings, which curtailed any
inquiry into the possibility that the use of a Bible as extraneous
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. The alleged biblical passage was Romans 13:1-8, which reads in part:
(1) Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no
authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist
have been established by God. (2) Consequently, he who rebels against the au-
thority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will
bring judgment on themselves. (3) For rulers hold no terror for those who do
right, but for those who do wrong . . . . (4) . . . [The ruler] is God's servant, an
agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.
Romans 13:1-4 (New International Version).
25. Young, 12 P.3d at 47.
26. Id. at 47-48.
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material in the deliberations ultimately led to Young's death sen-
tence.30
Despite this initial defeat in the appellate process, Young's
counsel pursued a second argument under the "extraneous mate-
rial" rubric.31 This novel contention posited before the Court of
Criminal Appeals the idea that "the source of the extraneous infor-
mation need not be literally external to the jury and in that vein...
even discussion of biblical doctrine and scripture between jurors
creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice." 32 In other words,
notwithstanding the questionable findings of the lower court as to
the actual physical presence of a Bible in the jury room during sen-
tencing, any discussion of religion in and of itself may have been
extraneous to such a degree that prejudicial decisionmaking possi-
bly ensued. 33 The court tersely rejected Young's argument by re-
vealing an understanding of the jurors' difficult charge: "We do not
find it surprising that 'conscientious people who are faced with a
life and death decision resort to their religious scruples in reaching
such a decision. Such deep introspection neither violates principles
of justice nor prejudices the defendant.' -34 By assuming merely an
introspective incorporation of religious principles by jurors in their
individual capacities, however, the court overlooked Young's central
argument: doctrinal discussion is necessarily extroverted, and may
therefore incorporate extraneous material into jury deliberations
that are supposed to focus upon balancing35 the mitigating and ag-
gravating factors36 in a defendant's case. 3
30. Id.
31. Id. at 48-49.
32. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
33. Id. Young's counsel submitted supplemental authorities after oral argument to the
Court of Criminal Appeals referencing numerous cases dealing with "improper prosecutorial
references to biblical doctrine," but the court distinguished these from the case at bar. Id. at 48
n.29; see also Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991) (holding prosecutor's
reference to biblical doctrine in argument constituted per se reversible error). But see Bennett v.
Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1346 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding prosecutor's reading of biblical passage to
justify the morality of the death penalty to be highly improper, but not in violation of defendant's
due process rights).
34. Young, 12 P.3d at 48-49 (quoting Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 203 (Ind. 1997), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1021 (1998)) (emphasis added).
35. Oklahoma Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate a balancing test in death penalty
cases:
The jury, if its verdict be a unanimous recommendation of death, shall desig-
nate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the statutory aggravating
circumstance or circumstances which it unanimously found beyond a reasonable
doubt. In nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation. Unless at least
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act is so
found or if it is found that any such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by,
the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty shall not
2001]
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Today, Kevin Young sits on death row in Oklahoma. 38 As
Young awaits his ultimate punishment, one must ask, in the words
of Justice Harlan in McGautha v. California,39 whether the jurors
who were "confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of de-
creeing death for a fellow human being act[ed] with due regard for
the consequences of their decision?"40 The converse may indeed be
be imposed. If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree as to punish-
ment, the judge shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment
for life without parole or imprisonment for life.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 2002).
36. Oklahoma rules specify eight aggravating factors, which, in substantial part, mirror
those listed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure § 3592(c). See supra note 9. Aggravating
factors recognized in Oklahoma include:
1. The defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person;
2. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one per-
son;
3. The person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remu-
neration or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the
promise of remuneration;
4. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel;
5. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a law-
ful arrest or prosecution;
6. The murder was committed by a person while serving a sentence of impris-
onment on conviction of a felony;
7. The existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; or
8. The victim of the murder was a peace officer . . . or guard of an institution
under the control of the Department of Corrections, and such person was killed
while in performance of official duty.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West 2000).
37. Young, 12 P.3d at 48-49; cf. Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 46-47 (1992) ("[In a 'weigh-
ing' State, where the aggravating and mitigating factors are balanced against each other, it is
constitutional error for the sentencer to give weight to an unconstitutionally vague aggravating
factor, even if other, valid aggravating factors obtain.").
38. Young, 12 P.3d at 50 ("Finding no error which warrants reversal of the convictions for
Attempted Robbery or Shooting with Intent to Kill or the conviction and sentence of death for
First Degree Murder, the Judgments and Sentences entered in Oklahoma County District Court
... are hereby AFFIRMED."); see also Oklahoma Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, Okla-
homa's Death Row, at http://www.ocadp.org/index.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002) (listing Kevin
Young among the prisoners currently on Oklahoma's death row).
39. 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (holding that the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not require states to establish mandatory sentencing guidelines for juries to follow in
death penalty cases because, in part, formulation of intelligible criteria appears to be a task
"beyond present human ability").
On the heels of the McGautha decision, one commentator posed an interesting question in
critique of the decision: "What does it mean about the nature of the death penalty that either it
cannot, so we are told, be administered through a set of rules guiding its allocation or that no
responsible organ of government is willing to take on the burden of allocating it?" Harry Kalven,
The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3,
25 (1971). That this very question arose, Kalven proposed, revealed "a fatal flaw, a kind of reduc-
tio ad absurdum in the death penalty itself." Id.
40. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207-08 (emphasis added).
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true, however, if the jury's sentencing decision turned upon reli-
gious discussion. To quote Justice Brennan's dissent in McGautha,
the Young jurors may have acted with "unchanneled judgment,"41 as
opposed to "judgment guided by reason and kept within bounds,"
42
in voting for the death penalty.
This Note examines the unique concept of placing the "ex-
traneous material" label on religious discussion in death penalty
sentencing deliberations. Ultimately, this Note advocates reassess-
ment and revision of the current capital punishment system in an
effort to account for religious discussion behind jury room doors. It
calls for changes to modern jury instructions and the capital pun-
ishment appellate process because both currently fail to recognize
the potentially prejudicial impact of religious discussion in death
penalty deliberations. Moreover, to the extent that rules of evi-
dence, both federal and state, impose seemingly impenetrable bar-
riers around jury deliberations, this Note argues that amendments
accounting for religious discussion in the capital punishment con-
text are critical.
Part II of this Note provides background information on the
role of the jury, particularly with respect to capital punishment,
and considers several problems that challenge the American com-
mitment to trial by jury. It also offers a basic overview of the law
concerning material extraneous to jury deliberations. Part III ex-
plores the principles embodied in Rule of Evidence 606(b), and
thereafter, describes the manner in which one state court applied
the rule to a capital punishment trial. Part IV addresses the need
for placing the extraneous material label on religious discussion in
capital punishment sentencing deliberations by emphasizing the
theological and secular arguments often enlisted by the competing
sides in the death penalty debate. Finally, Part V contends that
both federal and state courts should clarify the capital jury-judge
41. Id. at 285-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (emphasis added); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) ('It is of vital
importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sen-
tence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."). Justice Brennan's
dissent in McGautha calling for standards in respect to death penalty sentencing was arguably
vindicated a mere one year later in Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972) (holding all
state death penalty statutes in force at time of decision to be invalid as violations of Eighth
Amendment due to lack of guidance for juries in sentencing procedures); see also Hoffmann,
supra note 5, at 1137 (explaining that states quickly crafted new death penalty statutes in the
wake of Furman to satisfy the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment concerns, and noting that
the Court upheld three of these new statutes in 1976 (citing Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976))).
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dynamic and amend their interpretations of Rule 606(b) in order to
address the threat that extraneous religious discussion poses in
capital punishment deliberations.
II. THE ROLE OF THE JURY IN DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING
AND THE THREAT OF "EXTRANEOUS MATERIAL"
A. Our Commitment to Trial by Jury
The institution of the jury, a "mirror [of] the community's
values and attitudes,"43 has long served as the anchor of the crimi-
nal justice system in the United States. 44 The jury system is in-
grained in the American criminal forum to such a degree that "ad-
ministering our criminal law system without it is unthinkable."45
Studies reveal that the majority of Americans perceive the jury sys-
tem as fair. 46 In fact, if accused of murder, most would prefer trial
by jury, as opposed to trial before a judge.
47
The Supreme Court has explicitly adhered to the commit-
ment to trial by jury in criminal cases. 48 In Duncan v. Louisiana,
49
for example, the Court held that the Constitution guarantees adult
43. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1047,
1052 (1991).
44. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, PROXIMITY TO DEATH 76 (2000) (noting the "long tradi-
tion of the primacy of the jury"). But cf. Hon. Morris S. Arnold, The Civil Jury in Historical Per-
spective, in ROSCOE POUND FOUND., THE AMERICAN CIVIL JURY: FINAL REPORT OF THE 1986
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1987) (ex-
plaining that the judicial system in the United States has historically been the "kind of world
that allow[s] non-professionals to have.., much power and authority").
45. Higginbotham, supra note 43, at 1047 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 and U.S.
CONST. amend. VI). Section 2 of Article III states that "the trial of all crimes, except in cases of
impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crime
shall have been committed .... ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth Amendment assures
that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed... ."U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46. See Julian V. Roberts & Loretta J. Stalans, Crime, Criminal Justice, and Public Opin-
ion, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 47 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (noting that
although certain high-profile cases such as the acquittal of the police officers charged with using
excessive force against Rodney King have led to periods of discontent, the general.public contin-
ues to support the jury system based on its perceived procedural fairness).
47. See generally Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens' Perceptions of
the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333,
333-51 (1988).
48. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments guarantee a jury trial for defendant accused of misdemeanor punishable by
a maximum of two years in prison and a fine).
49. Id. at 145.
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criminal defendants the right to a jury trial as a means of guarding
against government oppression and the potential miscarriage of
justice.50 Furthermore, the Court has consistently transposed its
confidence in the jury system to the capital punishment setting by
acknowledging that juries are reflections of community values 5' in
the death penalty decision. 52 This respect and confidence in the jury
system reflects the Court's desire for a system that " 'secure[s] una-
nimity by a comparison of views' ,,53 and subsequently lends cre-
dence to jury decisions.54
B. Our Commitment Tested: Problems with the Jury Trial
One must not simply assume that a jury properly reflects
community values and meets its expectations as a representative
body of laypersons 55 charged with the duty of deciding life and
death in many instances. 56 Even the Supreme Court has purpose-
50. Id. at 155, 158.
51. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (declaring that the jury serves as a
"significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values"). But see Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the result of the per curiam
decision overturning three capital punishment sentences undermines "our basic trust in lay
jurors as the keystone in our system of criminal justice . . . [because] we [are] tak[ing] the most
sensitive and important of all decisions away from them").
52. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1988) (declaring that the government
has a "strong interest in having the jury 'express the conscience of the community on the ulti-
mate question of life or death' ").
53. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (1999) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
does not require that a jury receive instructions as to the consequences of potential failure to
reach unanimous sentencing decision) (quoting Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896)).
54. But see James S. Leibman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-
1995, ch. X, available at http://justice.policy.netljpreport (last visited Jan. 19, 2002) (concluding
that 'the capital punishment system revealed by our 23-year study is not a success, and is not
even minimally rational") (emphasis added).
55. Most likely, it is impossible within the death penalty system for a jury to be a proper re-
flection and representation of society at large. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 67-68 (1986) (contending that the capital jury
system does not provide an accurate index of societal values because, inter alia, prospective
jurors with fervent opinions, particularly those against the death penalty, are systematically
eliminated in the voir dire process); see also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (holding
that defendants possess the right to have defense counsel ask a prospective juror whether she
would always impose the death penalty upon conviction and, if the answer is yes, to excuse the
juror for cause).
56. Indeed, facing mounting numbers of necessary death row exonerations, some state gov-
ernments are reconsidering their commitments to capital punishment in general. See, e.g., Dirk
Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars. Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at Al ("Cit-
ing a 'shameful record of convicting innocent people and putting them on death row,' Gov. George
Ryan of Illinois today halted all executions in the state, the first such moratorium in the na-
tion."); Robynn Tysver, Death Penalty Study OI~d, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 28, 1999, at 1
(reporting that Nebraska's unicameral legislature passed a death penalty moratorium bill and
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fully stopped short of mandating jury sentencing in death penalty
cases. Indeed, in Proffitt v. Florida, Justice Powell proclaimed the
majority's belief that sentencing rendered by judges may result in
"even greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of
capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in sen-
tencing than a jury, and therefore, is better able to impose sen-
tences similar to those imposed in analogous cases." 57
States that choose to employ capital punishment may decide
to incorporate sentencing by either judge or jury. In Alabama, Flor-
ida, Delaware, and Indiana, for example, a jury's sentence in death
penalty cases serves merely as a "suggestion" to the judge, who may
thereafter impose the suggestion or sentence the defendant to an
alternative punishment. 58 In several other states, including Ari-
zona, Idaho, and Montana, a jury does not determine death penalty
sentences at all; instead, sentencing is left solely to judges.59
In addition, the Supreme Court's requirement that a capital
jury meet "death-qualification" standards, 60 which supposedly prove
that its members would fairly and impartially hear the evidence
and render a verdict serving the interests of justice,61 arguably op-
poses the vital need for inclusion of societal differences in the jury
system.62 In relation, according to one commentator, the context of
that, although the bill was vetoed by Governor Mike Johanns, the legislature unanimously over-
rode the veto with respect to a section allocating $165,000 to study the distribution of death
penalty imposition in Nebraska).
57. 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 448 (1984) (uphold-
ing judicial imposition of death penalty after jury returned recommendation of life imprison-
ment).
58. See, e.g., MCFEELY, supra note 44, at 76.
59. See id.
60. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 163 (1986).
61. See PALMER, supra note 5, at 83.
62. Joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, Justice Marshall's dissent in Lockhart im-
plored the majority to recognize the inherent exclusivity within "death-qualifications" and the
skewed decisions that necessarily result:
The perspectives on the criminal justice system of jurors who survive death
qualification are systematically different from those of the excluded jurors.
Death-qualified jurors are, for example, more likely to believe that a defen-
dant's failure to testify is indicative of his guilt, more hostile to the insanity de-
fense, more mistrustful of defense attorneys, and less concerned about the dan-
ger of erroneous convictions. . . . This proprosecution bias is reflected in the
greater readiness of death-qualified jurors to convict or to convict on more seri-
ous charges. . . . And . . . the very process of death qualification-which focuses
attention on the death penalty before the trial has even begun-has been found
to predispose the jurors that survive it to believe that the defendant is guilty.
476 U.S. at 188 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
In a similar vein, critics of the "death-qualified" jury requirement frequently argue that
Lockhart reflects the Court's disturbing prioritization of efficient capital punishment functional-
ity over adequate protection of capital defendants' rights. See WELSH WHITE, THE DEATH
138 [Vol. 55:
2001] THEOLOGY IN THE JURY ROOM 139
the courtroom and the death penalty trial, combined with the "mys-
tifying language of legal formality,"63 may distort the moral sense of
a jury in its effort to reach a justifiable sentencing decision.
A conglomeration of studies and scholarship has provided
evidence that jurors frequently suffer from a lack of comprehension
in two respects. 64 First, juries tend to misunderstand the complexi-
ties that underlie a variety of cases. 65 For instance, the issues in-
volved in many civil suits, particularly in the fields of antitrust,
intellectual property, and technology law, pose unique hurdles for
jury comprehension. 66 In addition, jurors in tort cases may fre-
quently fall subject to common psychological predispositions to at-
tribute behavior and related responsibility according to a defen-
dant's physical and personality traits (to the degree such traits may
be gleaned during trial), rather than in accordance with evidentiary
proof.
67
Concerns about jury miscomprehension 68 and psychological
predispositions translate readily to the death penalty sentencing
context. Arguably, jurors vote for the death penalty in accordance
with a defendant's traits, particularly race, in an alarming number
of cases. A 1990 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office to the
Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary, for example, con-
cluded: "The black defendant/white victim combination was the
most likely to receive the death penalty."69 Prosecutors arguably
recognize this discrepancy in juries' death penalty sentences and, in
PENALTY IN THE NINETIES 207 (1994); cf. MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 25 (1998) (contending that the result of a voir dire process through which "death-
qualification" is assessed results in juries that are ready and willing to impose the death pen-
alty).
63. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 392.
64. See David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59
JUDICATURE 478, 480 (1976) (discussing study results that jurors may not understand and apply
the law properly).
65. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (explaining that the " 'legal'
nature of an issue is determined by considering ... the practical abilities and limitations of ju-
ries"); see also Steven I. Friedland, Legal Institutions: The Competency and Responsibility of
Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 200-04 (1990) (explicating arguments against
submitting complex cases to juries).
66. See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 65, at 200-04.
67. See Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About
Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 127-40 (1995). Feigenson
refers to jurors' tendencies to attribute blame on the basis of supposed personality characteristics
of defendants as the "fundamental attribution error." Id. at 127.
68. See, e.g., Shari S. Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists, Juries, and Judges, 48
AM. PSYCHOL. 423, 423-30 (1993) (explaining the pervasive potential for jurors to miscompre-
hend capital punishment jury instructions).
69. DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES,
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. 90-57, at Summary (1990).
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many instances, pursue cases accordingly. A report in The New
York Times revealed that: "[A]lthough whites represent 35% of
murder victims, 85% of capital cases brought by local prosecutors
involve white victims. Prosecutors have sought the death penalty in
one of three murders of whites; with black victims the ratio drops to
1 in 17."7
0
Furthermore, many jurisdictions require death penalty ju-
ries to weigh aggravating factors against mitigating factors in a
defendant's case, 71 yet jurors may not understand the various com-
70. David Margolick, In Land of Death Penalty, Accusations of Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 1991, at Al. Nevertheless, even an elaborate five-year study showing that black defen-
dants in the State of Georgia accused of killing white victims face the greatest likelihood of death
penalty sentences did not withstand the Supreme Court's scrutiny in McCleskey v. Kemp. 481
U.S. 279, 286-313 (1987). The five-member majority held that the study proved neither arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment, nor discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 297-308. Justice Brennan, joined by three of his
colleagues in dissent, eloquently vented his frustration with the majority's position:
The judiciary's role in this society counts for little if the use of the governmen-
tal power to extinguish life does not elicit close scrutiny. . . . Those whom we
would banish from society or from the human community itself often speak in
too faint a voice to be heard above society's demand for punishment. It is the
particular role of courts to hear these voices, for the Constitution declares that
the majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the conditions of social life. The
Court thus fulfills, rather than disrupts, the scheme of separation of powers by
closely scrutinizing the imposition of the death penalty, for no decision of a so-
ciety is more deserving of "sober second thought."
Id. at 342-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. While adopting no official position on whether the death penalty should remain an au-
thorized sentence in the United States, the American Law Institute (ALI) included detailed lists
of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the Model Penal Code, which is mirrored in
numerous state statutes, under section 210.6:
(3) Aggravating Circumstances.
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also
committed another murder.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many per-
sons.
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was
an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or de-
viate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary
or kidnapping.
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity.
(4) Mitigating Circumstances.
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
20011 THEOLOGY IN THE JURY ROOM 141
ponents72 that underlie this complex balancing test.73 If confused,
jurors may unjustifiably cast sentencing votes according to their
individualized perceptions of a defendant's traits. 74 The disconcert-
ing number of capital punishment sentences that ultimately require
exoneration reflects, at least in part, the inherent possibility for
life-threatening jury mistakes. For instance, between 1972 and the
beginning of 1998, sixty-eight death row prisoners were released on
the grounds that their convictions were faulty.75 Even more disturb-
ing, however, are contentions that innocent individuals have been
executed. 76
A second reason that jurors frequently suffer from a lack of
comprehension is that, as many studies suggest, jurors often fail to
sufficiently comprehend jury instructions that courts currently
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant be-
lieved to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another per-
son and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another
person.
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirement of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or de-
fect or intoxication.
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)-(4) & explanatory note (1980).
72. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 80 (contending that the ALI opened a Pan-
dora's Box in section 210.6 by including numerous fine distinctions and complex subdivisions).
But see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652-56 (1990) (upholding a death penalty sentence in
which one aggravating factor was "especially heinous, cruel or depraved murder" because the
state's high court adequately clarified the factor's meaning and independently applied the factor
to the circumstances of the case).
73. See generally Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Under-
stand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1 (questioning jurors' abilities to adequately comprehend
mitigation as a legal concept so as to incorporate mitigation into sentencing deliberations).
74. See Feigenson, supra note 67, at 127-40.
75. See Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 130-32 (1998); see also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., INNOCENCE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: ASSESSING THE DANGER OF MISTAKEN EXECUTIONS 3 (Comm. Print, 1993) (re-
porting to members of Congress that the "most conclusive evidence that innocent people are
condemned to death under modern death sentencing procedures comes from the surprisingly
large number of people whose convictions have been overturned and who have been freed from
death row") [hereinafter INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY].
76. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND
MISTAKE 101 (1982) (suggesting that there have been executions of the innocent). Professor Hugo
Adam Bedau, one of the nation's foremost campaigners against the death penalty, contends that
it is beyond reasonable doubt that innocent persons have indeed been put to death, notwith-
standing the lack of irrefutable empirical proof. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 43
(1992).
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write and dictate. 77 In Gregg v. Georgia,78 the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly required that sentencing schemes, expressed in jury in-
structions, inform the jury as to the factors that it can properly con-
sider in deciding whether to impose the death penalty and how to
weigh those factors in order to sentence rationally and consis-
tently. 79 The Court, however, failed to account for the possibility
that juries may not, in many instances, truly understand such in-
structions, notwithstanding. the drafters' compliance with the
Court's mandate.80
In 1990, Professor Hans Zeisel conducted an experiment that
ultimately provided the first empirical evidence that defense coun-
sel have used to persuade a court that jury instructions might not
meet the guidance constitutionally required8' in a capital punish-
ment case.82 The Zeisel study involved jurors from actual cases lis-
tening and reading a description of the evidence from a capital pun-
ishment trial, as well as the jury instructions from the trial's sen-
tencing phase. 83 The jurors were then asked to read a series of de-
scriptions on hypothetical jurors' interpretations of specific evi-
dence and their subsequent hypothetical votes either in favor of or
against sentencing the defendant to the death penalty. 4 Finally,
the participants were asked whether the hypothetical jurors had
properly followed the jury instructions.8 5
Zeisel formulated his study to test the respondents' under-
standing of key legal issues, such as the nature of mitigating fac-
tors and the process of balancing both the aggravating and mitigat-
77. See generally SHARI S. DIAMOND & JUDITH N. LEVI, IMPROVING DECISIONS ON DEATH 7-
21 (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 9506, 1995) (detailing an experiment focusing on juror
comprehension with respect to instructions).
78. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
79. Id. at 206-07 (holding that the death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment, provided that the relevant death penalty statute provides
sufficient guidance to the sentencing authority, whether judge or jury, so as to avoid arbitrary
imposition of the punishment).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See generally DIAMOND & LEVI, supra note 77, at 3-7 (discussing the Zeisel study). Al-
though attempts have been made to persuade courts about the potentially unconstitutional na-
ture of some state jury instructions, none have succeeded. See generally Dan Luginbuhl, Com-
prehension of Judges' Instructions in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial: Focus on Mitigating
Circumstances, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 204 (1992) (describing research that compared juror
comprehension of instructions formerly used with comprehension of instructions currently used
and stating that this research failed to convince a state court that the former instructions were
deficient).
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ing factors in sentencing a defendant under Illinois capital punish-
ment law.8 6 Participants could respond with a "yes," "no," or "do not
know" answer. 87 The majority of respondents answered only three of
the sixteen questions correctly, and incorrectly answered eleven
questions. 88 A mere thirty-five percent answered correctly as to Illi-
nois law requiring jurors to balance the aggravating and mitigating
factors, as opposed to voting against a death sentence only when
mitigating factors are sufficient to overcome a supposed presump-
tion that juries should always err on the side of imposing the death
penalty.89
Defense counsel in United States ex rel. Free v. McGinnis9°
presented the Ziesel study to a magistrate judge in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois considering the habeas
corpus petition of James Free, a death row inmate. 91 The magis-
trate heard extensive testimony from psychologists, sociologists,
statisticians, and a linguist to assess the quality of the Zeisel
study.92 Finding that the jury instructions were not "intelligible and
definite enough to provide even a majority of jurors hearing them
with a clear understanding of how they are to go about deciding
whether the defendant lives or dies,"93 the magistrate held that the
instructions violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 94
Thereafter, a federal district court judge accepted the magistrate's
findings and vacated Free's death sentence. 95 Although the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overturned the district court's deci-
sion,96 both Free and the Zeisel study stand as proof that courts
86. See id. at 4-5.
87. Id. at 4. Zeisel asked questions such a, whether the existence of a mitigating factor bars
a sentence of death, and whether the jury is free to consider mitigating factors not enumerated in
the judge's instructions. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. 818 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
91. Id. at 1100-01.
92. See id. at 1104-13.
93. Id. at 1129.
94. Id. at 1129-30.
95. United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 806 F. Supp. 705, 732 (N.D. l. 1992). Before the
case reached the appellate level, however, the petitioner in another case, Gacy v. Welborn, pos-
ited the issues raised in the Zeisel study before the Seventh Circuit. 994 F.2d 305, 308-14 (7th
Cir. 1993). Judge Easterbrook rejected the study on the basis of an irrebuttable presumption
that jurors understand and follow instructions as currently given. Id. at 310-13.
96. When the Seventh Circuit considered Free, the court voted two-to-one to reject the Zeisel
study because defense counsel presented it only after finalization of the lower court judgment.
Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1993). Chief Judge Posner, however, in writing for the
majority, did not reject the possibility that empirical evidence could provide sufficient proof that
jury instructions in a capital case are constitutionally defective. Id. at 705-06. Instead, Posner
2001]
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will, at least in certain instances, consider empirical evidence to
assess the possibility of jury miscomprehension.
C. The Threat of Extraneous Material
In Remmer v. United States,97 the Supreme Court summa-
rized the threat that extraneous materials pose to the validity of
criminal proceedings. 98 The Court deemed "presumptively prejudi-
cial"99 any form of communication, contact, or tampering, whether
direct or indirect, with a juror in respect to a pending matter that is
not made in conformance with court rules. 100 Although the pre-
sumption of prejudice is not conclusive, the prosecution bears the
heavy burden of proving that such communication, contact, or tam-
pering constitutes harmless error.10 1 The integrity of trial by jury
under the Sixth Amendment was significant in the Court's reason-
ing in Remmer, as it remanded the case to the district court for a
hearing regarding the potential harm caused by communication be-
tween a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent and the jury fore-
person. 1
02
The Sixth Amendment, however, does not mandate a new
trial every time a juror is placed in a "potentially compromising
situation."10 3 Trial courts may instead conduct an investigation into
the possibility of prejudicial influence upon specific jurors by extra-
neous material. 0 4 An investigation typically takes the form of a
hearing to evaluate juror bias potentially stemming from exposure
rejected the Zeisel study on two other grounds: (1) the respondents' lack of success on the survey
questions may have only reflected their inability to take tests, not their capacity to comprehend
and follow jury instructions; and (2) the absence of a control group prohibited postulation that a
jury would perform better with rewritten instructions. Id.
97. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
98. Id. at 229. See generally David M. Fragale, Influences on the Jury, 88 GEO. L.J. 1367,
1367-76 (2000) (providing background information on the extraneous material concept in the
context of jury deliberations).
99. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-50 (1892) and Wheaton v. United
States, 133 F.2d 522, 527 (8th Cir. 1943)).
102. Id. at 229-30 (declaring that "[a] juror must feel free to exercise his functions without
the F.B.I. or anyone else looking over his shoulder" because "[tihe integrity of jury proceedings
must not be jeopardized by unauthorized invasions"); see also United States ex rel. Owen v.
McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1970) ("The touchstone of decision [as to the harm of extra-
neous contact] ... is thus not the mere fact of infiltration of some molecules of extra-record mat-
ter ... but the nature of what has been infiltrated and the probability of prejudice.").
103. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
104. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230.
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to extraneous material. 0 5 At this stage, the prosecution can argue
that the presumption of prejudice stemming from the presence of
extraneous material should be overcome. 106 Such arguments typi-
cally contend that the particular extraneous material is merely cu-
mulative, 10 7 that the evidence of a defendant's guilt is overwhelm-
ing to such a degree that exposure to extraneous material did not
affect the jury's decision, 08 or that the material in question is not
extraneous at all.10 9 If a court determines, however, that prejudice
did indeed result from extraneous influence, the defendant is enti-
tled to a new trial. 110
III. BELIEFS BLOCKADED: RULE OF EVIDENCE 606(B) AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES
A. The Parameters of Rule 606(b)
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)"' and its equivalent state
laws limit the scope of inquiry into the jury deliberation process. 112
105. The scope of such investigative hearings is limited by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),
which allows a juror to testify about extraneous material in the course of deliberations, but for-
bids testimony concerning one's emotional reactions or mental impressions. FED. R. EVID. 606(b);
see also infra Part III.
106. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230.
107. Cumulative evidence is defined as "[aidditional evidence of the same character as exist-
ing evidence and that supports a fact established by the existing evidence," particularly that
which does not need further support. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed. 1999). For cases in
which courts deemed certain extraneous material cumulative, see, for example, United States v.
Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 503-04 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the presumption of prejudice
resulting from a juror and an alternate juror driving through defendant's neighborhood was
overcome because any information obtained during the drive was merely cumulative of evidence
properly submitted at trial); Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1143 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the presumption of prejudice stemming from a juror's unauthorized visit to the crime scene was
overcome because any information the juror obtained during the visit was merely cumulative of
evidence properly submitted at trial); and Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 899-900 (4th Cir. 1996)
(rebutting the presumption of prejudice arising from the jury's consideration of photographs of
crime scene that were not properly submitted as evidence because other crime scene photographs
depicting same images had been admitted into evidence).
108. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 135 F.3d 1254, 1256 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that over-
whelming evidence of defendant's guilt overcame the presumption of prejudice resulting from
jury's exposure to inadmissible testimony about defendant's prior bad acts); Williams-Davis, 90
F.3d at 499-501 (holding that overwhelming evidence against defendant overcame presumption
of prejudice stemming from jury's exposure to media reports about the trial).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that jury
members' fears for their own safety, as well as that of their families, did not constitute extrane-
ous influence on the jury); United States v. George, 56 F.3d 1078, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that juror's use of magnifying glass to examine fingerprint and gun evidence was not prejudi-
cial because the magnifying glass was not extraneous material).
110. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230.
111. For the text of the rule, see supra note 7.
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More specifically, Rule 606(b) prohibits a juror from testifying
about her emotional reactions or mental impressions during delib-
erations. 113 Under the rule 114 a juror may, however, testify as to the
introduction of "extraneous prejudicial information," 115 or the pres-
sure of "outside influence."" 6
Rule 606(b) 117 arguably stands as a compromise between ju-
ror autonomy and finality of litigation, on the one hand, and protec-
tion against potential injustice, on the other."18 In McDonald v.
Pless,"9 the Supreme Court embraced the former aspect of the com-
promise in Rule 606(b) by forbidding post-deliberation inquiry. 120 In
112. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
113. Id.
114. The Advisory Committee commented on the division between juror contemplation and
extraneous material in Rule 606(b):
The trend has been to draw the dividing line between testimony to mental proc-
esses, on the one hand, and as to the existence of conditions or occurrences of
events calculated improperly to influence the verdict, on the other hand, with-
out regard to whether the happening is within or without the jury room ...
The jurors are the persons who know what really happened. Allowing them to
testify as to matters other than their own reactions involves no particular haz-
ard to the values sought to be protected. The rule is based upon this conclusion.
It makes no attempt to specify the substantive grounds for setting aside ver-
dicts for irregularity.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. For a comprehensive analysis of how the Supreme Court has addressed Rule 606(b) in
various contexts, see generally LILLIAN B. HARDWICK & B. LEE WARE, JUROR MISCONDUCT: LAW
AND LITIGATION (1988).
118. "The values sought to be promoted by excluding the evidence include freedom of delib-
eration, stability and finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and embar-
rassment. On the other hand, simply putting verdicts beyond effective reach can only promote
irregularity and injustice. The rule offers an accommodation between these competing considera-
tions." FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee's note (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264
(1915)).
In contrast, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report reflects a concern almost solely aimed at
jury independence: "Public policy requires a finality to litigation. And common fairness requires
that absolute privacy be preserved for jurors to engage in the full and free debate necessary to
the attainment of just verdicts. Jurors will not be able to function effectively if their deliberations
are to be scrutinized in post-trial litigation. In the interest of protecting the jury system and the
citizens who make it work, rule 606 should not permit any inquiry into the internal deliberations
of the jurors." S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 7060 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7060;
see also 120 CONG. REC. 2375 (1974) ("[T]o expand the permissibility of impeaching jurors ...
would create a Pandora's box of ill effects more than offsetting any benefit derived from mitigat-
ing the results of occasional incorrect jury deliberations .... [The essential goal of finality of
decision would be further endangered . . . [if unchecked inquiry into jury deliberation were al-
lowed].").
119. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
120. Id. at 269 (holding that federal jurors may not impeach a quotient verdict through juror
testimony). Justice Lamar, writing for the majority, stated:
[Liet it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned
into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part
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relation, the protection that Rule 606(b) offers against potential
injustice is, at least theoretically, embodied in its provision permit-
ting jurors to testify "on the question whether extraneous prejudi-
cial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon
any juror."'2 ' Such testimony sheds light on extraneous communica-
tion, contact, or tampering that may jeopardize the fairness of the
entire trial.
In contrast, some commentators cynically contend that the
actual aim of Rule 606(b) is to protect the American jury system
against the loss of public faith that could potentially flow from sub-
stantive inquiry into the deliberation process and the mental im-
pressions of individual jurors. 122 Indeed, certain Supreme Court
Justices may harbor similar concerns about the potential for un-
dermining the jury system upon extensive examination of delibera-
tions. Justice O'Connor, for instance, has spoken directly to the
vulnerability of the jury system against post-deliberation attack:
"There is little doubt that post-verdict investigation into juror mis-
conduct would in some instances lead to invalidation of verdicts
reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior. It is not at
all clear, however, that the jury system could survive such efforts to
perfect it."123
in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by
an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the
finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort
to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct suffi-
cient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the re-
sult would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the con-
stant subject of public investigation-to the destruction of all frankness and
freedom of discussion and conference.
Id. at 267-68; see also Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) ("Freedom of debate might be
stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and
ballots were to be freely published to the world.").
121. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
122. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremp-
tory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 227 (1989) (con-
tending that rules concerning jury inquiry embody a "refusal to know" the reality of delib-
erations because of "what we know already-that our system of jury controls frequently
fails").
123. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987).
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B. The Reality of Rule 606(b)
In State v. DeMille,12 4 a unique case involving a juror's reli-
gious belief and the consequences levied upon a defendant as a di-
rect result, the Supreme Court of Utah grappled with the practical
implications of Rule 606(b). 125 At the trial stage, a jury found
Leland DeMille guilty of the second-degree murder of a three-year-
old child. 126 A juror's post-conviction affidavit revealed a disturbing
occurrence during the deliberations that prompted DeMille's subse-
quent motions. 127 In the course of deliberations, a particular juror
told fellow jury members that she had prayed for a -sign relating to
DeMille's guilt or innocence. 128 The juror claimed she had received a
"revelation," instructing her that DeMille was guilty if the defense
counsel did not make eye contact with her during the closing argu-
ment.129 Indeed, the defense counsel failed to look this particular
juror in the eye, and as a result, the juror later voted to convict
DeMille. 130 DeMille moved for a new trial based on this possible
misconduct, but the trial judge ruled that the juror affidavit was
inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) and denied De-
Mille's motion.131
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah, DeMille's counsel
argued that the juror improperly introduced an outside influence by
reporting the "answer to her prayer"132 to fellow members of the
jury.133 The court rejected this contention, and conversely, affirmed
the lower court's decision on three grounds. 134 First, the court
124. 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988).
125. Id. at 84-85.
126. Id. at 81-82.
127. The affidavit reads, in relevant part:
5. Said juror, [juror's name], further stated to the affiant and the other jurors
in said jury room during said deliberations, that while the defendant's attorney
was giving his closing argument, she, [the juror], prayed, ". . . that if said at-
torney made eye contact with her she would know he was telling the truth, but
if he did not she would know he was not telling the truth about defendant; that
he did not make eye contact with her, so she knew said attorney was not telling
the truth," concerning the defendant. ...
7. Said juror, [name of juror], was one of the leaders, during the deliberations
by the jury, of the faction seeking a speedy and early determination of guilt of
the defendant.
Id. at 85.
128. Id. at 83.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 82.
132. Id. at 83-84.
133. Id. at 82-84.
134. Id. at 84.
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stated that considering prayer, or even supposed answers to prayer,
as falling under the exception to Rule 606(b) 135 would mistakenly
imply that it is always improper for a juror to rely upon prayer as
one aspect of her personal decisionmaking process. 136 The court ex-
pressed concern that an inquiry into prayer would infringe upon a
juror's religious liberties and potentially lead to a "religious test"
for jury service. 137 Second, the court found that a single juror's de-
scription of her own religious experience, even if used as a means to
persuade fellow jurors to vote in favor of conviction, would not con-
stitute an "illegitimate inter-juror dynamic." 138 According to the
court, this particular juror, as well as her fellow jurors, maintained
the presumption of impartiality. 139 Lastly, the court declared that,
notwithstanding the potential evidence of a juror's incapacity to
weigh the facts and apply the law impartially, Rule 606(b) barred
DeMille's challenge because it was based on a post-conviction affi-
davit. 140 The affidavit, in the majority's view, did not fall under the
exception for juror testimony concerning extraneous material in
Rule 606(b).' 4 ' Instead, the court reasoned that defense counsel had
sufficient opportunity during the voir dire process to raise any
doubts as to the fitness of this individual to serve as a juror.
142
135. The exception allows a juror to "testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror." UTAH R. EVID. 606(b).
136. Justice Zimmerman, in authoring the majority opinion, forged a defense around prayer
during deliberations by noting that
[pirayer is almost certainly a part of the personal decision-making process of
many people, a process that is employed when serving on a jury. There is no
necessary inconsistency between proper performance as a juror and reliance on
prayer or supposed responses to prayer. So long as a juror is capable of fairly
weighing the evidence and applying the law to the facts, one may not challenge
that juror's decision on grounds that he or she may have reached it by aid of
prayer or supposed responses to prayer.
DeMille, 756 P.2d at 84.
137. Id. The majority cited article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that
"no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote
at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious
belief or the absence thereof...." UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4.
138. DeMille, 756 P.2d at 84. The majority acknowledged, however, that a juror may indeed
rely upon religious experiences to such an extent that fairness would be compromised in some
instances. Id. Specifically, the court said, "We recognize that a juror might so abandon his or her
judgment to what he or she perceives to be oracular signs as to be unable to fairly consider the
evidence and properly apply the law." Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 85.
141. Id.
142. Id. According to the court, because "defense counsel did not raise the matter [during voir
dire] .... any such claims were waived once the trial commenced." Id.
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Refusing to regard Rule 606(b) as impenetrable, one justice
vehemently dissented in DeMille.143 The dissent contended that de-
pendence on divine intervention in rendering a verdict is a "throw-
back to the primitive days of trial by ordeal" in which judgment
rested solely on perceived signs from God.'" Although it acknowl-
edged that Rule 606(b) is a critical safeguard for juror thought
processes, 145 the dissent distinguished between instances in which a
juror legitimately seeks divine assistance in contemplating the evi-
dence and those instances in which a juror illegitimately abdicates
her sworn duty to decide impartially and instead bases her vote
solely on divine revelation.
146
The dissent offered interesting examples of illegitimate abdi-
cation: "Verdicts based on chance or bribery, for example, have long
been subject to challenge, since they do not even purport to be
based on the law and the evidence .... Thus, if jurors were to agree
that a verdict would be based on a 'divine sign,' a Ouija board an-
swer, or some fortuitous event, such a verdict, in my judgment,
would constitute a denial of due process and the right to trial by
jury."1
47
The dissent's position, however, has faced criticism, charging
that it establishes what is, in essence, a post-deliberation juror
"litmus test."148 Such arguments, and to a certain degree the major-
ity's position in DeMille, however, fail to completely account for ju-
ror interaction following supposed answers to prayer or religious
revelations. An individual juror's dependence upon religion or
prayer is understandable and, perhaps, beneficial, provided that it
does not become the sole criterion of judgment or sentencing. The
true problem arises when that same individual juror attempts to
convince other jurors of her position as grounded in religion instead
143. Id. at 85-86 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (declaring that "certainly verdicts are not abso-
lutely inviolate").
144. Id. at 85.
145. Id. (recognizing that "[slound reasons support the general policy against allowing im-
peachment of jury verdicts by attacking the mental processes used by jurors to arrive at a ver-
dict," and admitting that challenges are impermissible when jurors purport to decide on the basis
,of the facts under scrutiny of law, "even if jurors may have acted on the basis of some alleged
error or misunderstanding").
146. Id.
147. Id. at 85-86.
148. See Michael Ariens, Evidence of Religion and the Religion of Evidence, 40 BUFF. L. REV.
65, 99-101 (1992) (arguing that Justice Stewart's dissenting view in DeMille would require a trial
court to make factual inquiries into the decisionmaking process of a juror to determine "whether
that juror used divine guidance to (rationally) assess the evidence in the case or whether the
juror impermissibly (irrationally) decided the case based on a revelation from God").
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of the relevant aspects of the case at hand. The following part of
this Note addresses the impact that such religious discussion may
have in the capital punishment jury room.
IV. RELIGIOUS DISCUSSION AS "EXTRANEOUS MATERIAL"
A. Can Discussion Ever Be Extraneous?
Courts have faced numerous cases in which jurors consulted
a Bible during deliberations. Some courts have overturned jury ver-
dicts and sentences as a result of Bibles in jury rooms, 149 whereas
others have considered similar occurrences to be harmless error.
150
Most likely, countless additional juries have turned to the Bible as
well, but those religious consultations, for whatever reason, were
never revealed.
When not properly admitted into evidence as part of a trial,
Bibles in the jury room constitute extraneous material, which could
potentially prompt judicial inquiry into the resultant impact on the
jury.' 51 The actual presence of a Bible in a jury room, however, is
not necessary for certain individual jurors to contemplate, or debate
about, biblical scripture and principles. 152 After all, one cannot
"shrug[ I off' 153 her religious faith and knowledge once the jury
room doors are closed. Thus, the potential for extraneous biblical
references in the course of jury discussion, notwithstanding consul-
tation of an actual Bible, is pervasive.
Courts do retain a clear ability to preclude certain discussion
in the jury room. For instance, courts have acknowledged that dis-
cussion, in and of itself, about parole laws as justification for levy-
ing either harsher or more lenient sentences can constitute miscon-
duct in the course of jury deliberations. 154 Whether parole law dis-
149. See, e.g., Jones v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that lower
court committed constitutional error, in part, by granting jurors' request to consult a Bible dur-
ing sentencing deliberations).
150. See, e.g., Jones v. Francis, 312 S.E.2d 300, 303 (Ga.) (holding that the trial judge erred
by permitting the jury to consult a Bible during capital punishment deliberations, but the defen-
dant did not suffer prejudicial harm even though the jury voted for a death sentence), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984).
151. See supra Part II.
152. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932,
940 (1989) (contending that "[tihe very idea of devotion suggests a way of ordering all life and all
knowledge, including, although not exclusively, moral knowledge").
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., State v. Sanders, 496 S.E.2d 568, 601 (N.C. 1998); Valdez v. State, 893 S.W.2d
721, 724 (Tex. App. 1995); Harris v. Virginia, 408 S.E.2d 599, 601-02 (Va. 1991).
20011 151
152 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:
cussion constitutes reversible error, however, depends on the cir-
cumstances in the particular deliberations. 155 Similarly, religious
discussion in the capital punishment context may have a significant
impact on a defendant's fate. Despite the fact that jurors might
never consult an actual religious text, courts overseeing capital
punishment trials should regard the mere discussion of religion as
extraneous and evidence of jury misconduct.
B. Why Religious Discussion?
An actual juror described deliberations in which she and her
fellow jurors voted to sentence a defendant to the death penalty in
the following way:
[AIIl fifteen of us [jurors] felt the need to [pray together]. And it seemed like ...
before our deliberation of the guilt phase, and then before our deliberation of the
penalty phase, and then after the penalty phase deliberating, yeah, before each of
the deliberations, [we prayed] . . . and then, prayed for [the defendant] after our
deliberation of the penalty.
156
As evidenced in this statement, the distinctly influential
power of religion, 5 7 regardless of the faith, 158 calls for close scrutiny
when capital punishment sentencing decisions sway in the balance.
Although some posit religious justifications for abolishing the death
penalty, countless others base their competing arguments in favor
of the punishment on religious grounds as well.159 The ultimate vic-
155. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 535 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Tex. 1976).
156. Hoffmann, supra note 5, at 1154.
157. See, e.g., GERALD A. MCHUGH, CHRISTIAN FAITH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARD A
CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1 (1978) (depicting the enormous impact that
Christianity, in particular, has historically had on justice systems by explaining that "such phe-
nomena as the popular acceptance of criminal law as a moral code, belief in the absolute right of
the state to punish, belief in the ultimate justness of punishment, and the practice of imprison-
ment itself ... have derived no small measure of force and legitimacy from Christian thought
and practice").
158. For a review of Jewish perspectives on the death penalty, see Gerald J. Blidstein, Capi-
tal Punishment: The Classic Jewish Discussion, 14 JUDAISM 159, 159-68, reprinted in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: A READER 107, 107-17 (Glenn H. Stassen ed., 1998) (concluding that Jewish theol-
ogy holds two philosophies, "one that regards the enforcing of retribution as most just and hence
most merciful, and an other, which finds mercy too divinely dynamic a quality to be forever de-
fined and controlled by the demand for retribution"). For a similar review of Islamic perspectives
on capital punishment, see Mohammed Arkoun, The Death Penalty and Torture in Islamic
Thought, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND TORTURE 75 (Franz Bockle & Jacques Pohier eds., 1978),
reprinted in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A READER 137, 144 (Glenn H. Stassen ed., 1998) (describing
the often conflicting views regarding Islamic punishment, particularly in light of the ever-
shifting political conditions in many Islamic countries).
159. See, e.g., Robert L. Young, Religious Orientation, Race, and Support for the Death Pen-
alty, 31 J. SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 76, 78-80 (1992), reprinted in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A
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tor in a specific capital punishment deliberation may fall on either
side of the dichotomy, yet only the latter perspective has the poten-
tial actually to end an individual's life.
It is then that the capital punishment sentencing process
most clearly resembles a game of chance. Imagine, for example, a
jury in the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial leaving its ul-
timate decision to a coin flip. Heads: life imprisonment. Tails: exe-
cution. Imagine further, for example, jurors basing their sentencing
on a "flip" of biblical scripture. One juror quotes from the Book of
Exodus 21: "(23) But if there is serious injury, you are to take life
for life, (24) eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot,
(25) burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise." 160 Another
juror quotes Romans 12: "(17) Do not repay anyone evil for evil. Be
careful to do what is right in the eyes of everybody. (18) If it is pos-
sible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone. (19)
Do not take revenge, my friends, but leave room for God's wrath."
161
If the former prevails, the defendant will likely face the death pen-
alty. If the latter, the defendant may face life imprisonment. In
such a scenario, Justice Brennan's concerned depiction of a death
penalty "lottery system" becomes an unfortunate reality. 162
The following two subsections of this Note are intended to
provide an overview of the capital punishment debate with a focus
on several common religious contentions therein. The religious-
based arguments, in particular, provide examples of what religious
discussion as extraneous material in jury deliberations may entail.
1. The Case for Vengeance
Capital punishment advocates often cloak their arguments
with religious passages and principles. 163 Indeed, aspects of Judaic,
READER 205, 207-09 (Glenn H. Stassen ed., 1998) (distinguishing between "fundamentalists,"
who reject moral relativism and tend to support direct punitive measures such as the death
penalty on religious grounds, and "evangelists," who embrace the notion of conversion from sin
and thus disagree with the death penalty in so far as it "puts the lost soul beyond the reach of
those who might be able to lead him or her to a state of grace").
160. Exodus 21:23-25 (New International Version).
161. Romans 12:17-19 (New International Version).
162. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
163. See, e.g., GARDNER C. HANKS, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR
ARGUMENTS AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 25 (1997) (observing that Christians who defend
capital punishment on scriptural grounds frequently make reference to the Old Testament, with
particular focus on God's words to Noah following the flood: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by
man shall his blood be shed." (referring to Genesis 9:6 (New International Version))); HOWARD
ZEHR, DEATH AS A PENALTY: A MORAL, PRACTICAL AND THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION 18 (1998) (not-
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Islamic, and Christian theologies 164 contain notions of retribution
arguably in support of the death penalty. Such retributive beliefs
have become more prevalent in recent years as justification for
criminal punishment generally. 165 Many ardent retributivists have
argued that the criminal justice system should serve a purely de-
nunciatory purpose.166 With decades of increasing crime rates serv-
ing as a catalyst, 167 numerous American politicians have sought to
implement sweeping penal initiatives aimed at dispelling fear and
answering the retributivist calls amongst their constituents. 168
The rise of retributive philosophy is reflected in the fact that
the number of Americans favoring the death penalty for convicted
murderers has steadily increased since 1936.169 Coinciding with the
ing that supportive references are often grounded in the Old Testament, in which vengeance is a
persistent theme).
164. See, e.g., REV. VIRGINIA MACKEY, PUNISHMENT IN THE SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION OF
JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM, at viii-ix (1981) (explaining that Jewish, Christian, and
Islamic supporters of capital punishment all offer variations on "a 'theology of retribution,' which
maintains that God punishes and expects humans to punish in order to dignify human nature or
modify human behavior").
165. Cf Dario Melossi, Gazette of Morality and Social Whip: Punishment, Hegemony and the
Case of the USA, 1970-92, 2 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 259, 273 (1993), reprinted in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
PUNISHMENT: SOCIO-STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVES 483, 497 (Dario Melossi ed., 1998) (describing
punishment as a symbolic and preventative societal activity that is "much more important for
what it tells every member of that society about desirable behavior and threatened sanctions,
than for the way it is applied to the individual offender").
166. See, e.g., Andrew Von Hirsch, Penal Theories, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME &
PUNISHMENT 659, 676-77 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (noting that current penal trends, such as
the "three-strikes" program, reflect a "popular resentment ... expressive of fear and loathing of
crime and of criminals" and often reap political benefits for proponents heralding "an ideology of
purging 'undesirables' from the body politic").
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 11, at 18 (noting that, in recent
years, "it has been virtually impossible for any candidate for high elective office in the states-
governor, attorney general, appellate court judge-to appear hesitant over (much less opposed to)
the death penalty"); SMITH, supra note 10, at ix (contending that although politicians cannot
actually control crime, "they can impose severe punishments on those individuals who are caught
and convicted");
169. See Melossi, supra note 165, at 272 (describing the rising percentage of Americans an-
swering "yes" when asked "Do you favor the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?" in
Gallup polls between 1936 and 1985 and noting the increase from a low of 42% in 1966 to a high
of 72% in 1985).
As early as 1958, the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles acknowledged that the phrase "cruel
and unusual punishment" derives its meaning from "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Over a decade later, the
Court's plurality opinion in Furman v. Georgia stopped short of declaring the death penalty
unconstitutional per se, but similarly indicated that public sentiment concerning the death pen-
alty is an essential factor in determining whether the punishment should be absolutely barred
(notwithstanding proper guidelines for the sentencing authority to follow) by the Eighth
Amendment. 408 U.S. 238, 299-300 (1972). Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court held
death penalty imposition for murder convictions was per se constitutional provided that state
20011 THEOLOGY IN THE JURY ROOM 155
rise in public support, the number of executions in the United
States has also risen abruptly.170 Retributive perspectives regarding
the death penalty often merge with the more instrumental view
that capital punishment satisfies the public's sense of justice.
171
Under this combination of theories, a defendant sentenced to the
death penalty arguably serves as a "sacrificial lamb" 172 upon which
society and, more particularly, the jury expresses its outrage and
releases its fears in a moment of "cathartic release."
1 73
death penalty statutes establish proper sentencing guidelines. 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976). The
Court based its decision, in part, on community sentiment as expressed in the fact that thirty-
five states had passed revised death penalty statutes in the wake of Furman, including one
statewide referendum in which the majority of the public voted in favor of the death penalty. Id.
at 179-81.
Thus, societal views carry constitutional implications with respect to defining what consti-
tutes "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. It therefore follows that a
rise in public support for the death penalty, specifically, and retributive punishment, generally,
may serve to entrench capital punishment further as a viable aspect of the American criminal
justice system. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Ameri-
cans' Views on the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
90, 91 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) (contending that, in the long term, "popular support may
not be sufficient to guarantee the retention of the death penalty" but that "[oln the other hand,
popular support may well be necessary to the continued use of the death penalty in this coun-
try").
170. See James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995,
at n.4, at http://justice.policy.netjpreport (last visited Jan. 20, 2002). From 1984 to 1991, an
average of fifteen individuals were executed annually in the United States. Id. The average rose
to approximately thirty per year between 1992 and 1994, and to approximately sixty per year
during the next four years. Id. In 1999, the number reached ninety-eight executions, the most in
a single year since 1951. Id.
171. In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Brennan articulated (and subsequently argued against)
the common prosecutorial view of the death penalty's retributive/instrumental worth:
The infliction of death, the States urge, serves to manifest the community's out-
rage at the commission of the crime. It is, they say, a concrete public expression
of moral indignation that inculcates respect for the law and helps assure a more
peaceful community. Moreover, we are told, not only does the punishment of
death exert this widespread moralizing influence upon community values, it
also satisfies the popular demand for grievous condemnation of abhorrent
crimes and thus prevents disorder, lynching, and attempts by private citizens
to take the law into their own hands.
408 U.S. at 303.
172. Hearings on S. 1760 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 11 (1968) (statement of Hon. Michael V. DiSalle, former
Governor of Ohio) (lit is usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the member of the
minority group-the man who, because he is without means, and is defended by a court-
appointed attorney-who becomes society's sacrificial lamb ... ").
173. James McBride, Capital Punishment as the Unconstitutional Establishment of Religion:
A Girardian Reading of the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A READER 189 (Glenn H.
Stassen ed., 1998). McBride posits an interesting argument in this context. He contends that
capital punishment maintains an inherently religious character by which "the condemned serves
as a 'sacrificial lamb' who dies for us and thereby saves us from the spiral of violence which oth-
erwise would surely ensue." Id. Justice Stewart, in the lead opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, ex-
pressed a similar sentiment. 428 U.S. at 183 (explaining that capital punishment, in part, "is an
expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct").
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2. The Case for Mercy and Forgiveness
Coinciding with the rise of retributivism, the shift away from
rehabilitation 174 within the criminal justice system has placed sub-
stantial pressure on death penalty opponents. In response, some
have launched direct attacks on retributive philosophies of punish-
ment, hoping to establish a "theology of restoration" in its place. 175
Instead of vengeance through execution, as related abolitionist ar-
guments run, society should move beyond barbaric retribution 176
toward deeper understanding of the criminal condition.177
Still others who oppose the death penalty launch unapolo-
getic attacks against invocation of the ultimate punishment. Using
religious principles as support, such arguments assert that the use
of capital punishment necessarily entails human usurpation of di-
vine power over life and death. 178 To execute an individual, accord-
ing to this abolitionist viewpoint, is to infuse human fallibility 179
174. See, e.g., Von Hirsch, supra note 166, at 661 (citing disappointment with treatment ef-
forts as the main reason rehabilitative models of punishment have declined since the early
1970s); Kevin Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentencing Appeals: A Comparison of
Federal and State Experiences, 37 J. CHURCH & STATE 263, 272 (1995), reprinted in THE
HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 542, 542 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (observing that reha-
bilitation, "once the guiding theoretical light of American sentencing structures, has fallen by the
wayside in the past two and a half decades, leaving policy makers scrambling for an alternative
blueprint").
175. MACKEY, supra note 164, at 49. Mackey perceives religious faith as the key to solving
many of the modern world's criminal problems. Id. (imploring the religious community to "rein-
terpret scriptural values for a world grown tired of the cycle of violence and vengeance").
176. In his concurring opinion in Furman, Justice Marshall stated that the Eighth Amend-
ment protection from cruel and unusual punishment serves as "insulation from our baser selves."
408 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J., concurring).
177. For the Christian faith, such understanding is rooted in the New Testament. See gener-
ally John H. Yoder, Noah's Covenant, the New Testament, and Christian Social Order, reprinted
in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 429, 438-42 (Hugo Adam Bedau
ed., 1997) (describing civil order as a derivative of events chronicled in the New Testament).
178. STEFFEN, supra note 1, at 156. Professor Steffen's stridently sarcastic argument speaks
best for itself:
Human appropriation of such power [over life and death], and God's deputizing
of human beings to exercise this power knowing that it cannot be exercised con-
sistently with God's perfect justice, necessarily leads us to conclude that the re-
ligious meaning of the death penalty is that God is dead. God is dead because
human beings have usurped a divine power. If human beings can do God's work
as God would do it-perfectly-then God is emptied of meaning.
Id.
179. Human fallibility under abolitionist accounts would include imposition of the death
penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 293 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("When a country of over 200 million people inflicts an unusually severe punishment
no more than 50 times a year, the inference is strong that the punishment is not being regularly
and fairly applied.").
20011 THEOLOGY IN THE JURY ROOM
into the properly divine decision as to who should live and who
should die.180
V. TOWARD BALANCED ODDS: ADDRESSING THE
THEOLOGICAL LOTTERY GAME IN DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING
A. The Need for Simple, Clear Jury Instructions
When the door shuts behind a capital jury, seemingly im-
penetrable legal walls fortifying the ensuing deliberations instantly
arise. 181 Whether or not those jurors truly understand the instruc-
tions given to them only moments before,182 they bear the responsi-
bility of determining life or death for a fellow human being.
8 3
Judges typically fail, however, to express the magnitude of such
responsibility in capital punishment jury instructions. 8 4 In many
instances, this failure invites jurors to depend on religious discus-
sion, and leaves those on the outside concerned for defendants' fates
struggling for a mere glimpse inside those intimidating jury room
walls.
Thus, capital jury instructions, 85 as well as the very process
by which judges dictate those instructions, should be changed in
three basic respects. First, instructions should clearly express the
subtleties and relevant legal terminology involved in a particular
180. See STEFFEN, supra note 1, at 154 (contending that human systems of justice are "beset
with fallibility and an imperfect moral knowledge").
181. See, e.g., Higginbotham, supra note 43, at 1049 (referring to the jury as the "blackbox of
the judicial system" because of the inscrutable defenses surrounding it).
182. Consider, for example, an actual juror's depiction of the confusion wrought by the in-
structions given to the capital jury on which she served:
They tried to prepare us, but were we prepared? No, I do not feel like we were.
We understood what we were doing but the way we were supposed to come up
with that verdict using these specific instructions were [sic] confusing, the
manner in which those forty pages were [sic] written. It was very little use to
us. The aggravating and mitigating factors were verbally presented, I read it to
the jurors. It was not clear at all. When the bailiff brought all the evidence in,
we all looked at each other and said, "Now what do we do?"
Hoffmann, supra note 5, at 1151.
183. But see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1980) (holding that a jury may not im-
pose the death penalty when instructions regarding aggravating factors are overly broad and
vague).
184. Cf. Hoffmann, supra note 5, at 1158 (contending that instructions should encompass
unequivocal language informing jurors that their roles are intentionally difficult, and that each
must individually bear the responsibility for the death penalty sentencing decision).
185. Some have argued that altered jury instructions would still prove ineffective against
widespread public biases, which constantly enter into the fray of deliberations and unjustifiably
influence outcomes. See, e.g., Roberts & Stalans, supra note 46, at 38.
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case, so as to account fully for modern linguistic understanding. 8 6
When the complexities of a given set of capital sentencing instruc-
tions overly burden a jury, the threat of religious discussion as ex-
traneous material takes root, and may thereafter grow unfettered
until it suffocates the entire dignity of the life or death decision.
Consequently, judges should take the initiative to formulate clear,
simple, and tailored jury instructions that, 8 v at least in part, ac-
count for such an imposing potential problem in capital delibera-
tions. 88 Pattern instructions are not the answer because judges
cannot effectively recast their language to clearly reflect the details
of specific cases. 8 9 Instead, judges should use case-specific instruc-
tions, organized in short, simple sentences, written in an active
rather than passive voice, and void of legal jargon. Perhaps most
significantly, such tailored instructions should explicitly inform ju-
rors of their collective responsibility to avoid discussing extraneous
matters, particularly their respective religious views.
Second, judges should foreshadow sentencing deliberation
instructions by incorporating written pre-instruction to juries. 190
186. See generally; Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Under-
standable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1321-58
(1979) (analyzing the results of psycholinguistic research on juror comprehension of various
linguistic constructions); William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and
Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REv. 731, 739 (1981) (contending that typical jury instructions "abound
with legal language and abstract concepts, both obstacles to juror comprehension"). Indeed, some
commentators suggest that courts should provide written instructions to juries. See, e.g., Strawn
& Buchanan, supra note 64, at 483 (suggesting that written instructions may alleviate confusion
in the jury room).
187. To effectuate this change, however, judges must overcome their traditional reluctance to
diverge from the safe harbor of pattern instructions. See Schwarzer, supra note 186, at 737.
Judicial experimentation with jury instructions is rare, due in substantial part to fears of subse-
quent reversal on appeal. Id. Thus, to countervail these fears and prompt necessary changes in
jury instructions, appeals courts should be willing to accept more judicial innovation.
188. This Note purposefully stops short of advocating that jury instructions must always and
necessarily entail prescriptions against religion and religious influences, per se, as part of delib-
erations. To do so would usurp a court's prerogative in this respect, and this Note "in no way
means to suggest that jurors cannot rely on their personal faith and deeply-held beliefs when
facing the awesome decision of whether to impose the sentence of death on a fellow citizen."
Jones v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (emphasis added). Any attempt to ar-
ticulate a total bar on religion in the deliberation process could possibly infringe upon individual
religious liberties. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 152, at 940 (contending that calls for abandon-
ment of faith when religious citizens serve in public capacities are perverse because they "ask the
devout citizen to become another person, to abandon the most important aspect of her life").
Therefore, this Note addresses the need for jury instructions, as well as other aspects of the
capital punishment system, sufficiently to acknowledge and account for religious discussion that
crosses the extraneous material line.
189. See Schwarzer, supra note 186, at 739 (suggesting that "despite their convenience, [pat-
tern instructions] ... are a poor vehicle for communicating with jurors").
190. Cf DIAMOND & LEVI, supra note 77, at 21 (advocating pre-instruction).
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The current practice of orally instructing jurors as to their sentenc-
ing duties only at the beginning of the sentencing phase is inade-
quate. Straightforward, written pre-instruction regarding the entire
duties of jurors, before even the trial phase begins, would equip ju-
rors with a modicum of knowledge, at a minimum, about important
factors to anticipate during the course of the trial.19 Even more im-
portantly, however, pre-instruction could serve to inform capital
jurors as to the magnitude of their upcoming role as sentencers,
thereby entrenching the notion of their responsibility to decide
fairly and rationally a defendant's punishment.
Lastly, jurors must hold a viable right to ask questions to the
court throughout the sentencing process. In turn, judges should
willingly clarify any ambiguities. 192 Instructions need to express the
court's willingness to help jurors overcome any confusion as to their
role in sentencing. Admittedly, answering a jury's questions con-
cerning the method of balancing aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, for example, could potentially decrease efficiency in
the capital sentencing process. Nevertheless, the ultimate conse-
quences of death penalty deliberations certainly warrant sufficient
safeguards against, and ample opportunities to ameliorate, jury
confusion. When judges provide little clarification and individual
jurors have nowhere to turn for guidance, juries may then choose to
commence the theological lottery game with odds stacked heavily
against defendants. To counter this possibility, a juror should feel
that she not only may, but rather, is obligated to disclose to the
judge any religious discussion amongst jurors. By opening the lines
of communication between judge and jury, the capital punishment
game of chance may indeed become more predictable and just in its
outcomes.
191. Cf. id. (contending that pre-instruction foreshadows the "legally relevant" factors in a
trial).
192. During the "Capital Jury Project" interviews, one juror described the pervasive exas-
peration amongst the entire jury in respect to specific sentencing instructions:
[I]t was . ..very frustrating, because, they just kept tellin', y'know the bailiff,
just kept sayin', "Read the instructions." And here are twelve people who really
don't, y'know, and it's kind of left up to us to interpret them, and come to an
agreement on that interpretation, and that's really scary, because you think,
"Well what if we're wrong?" . . . "what if we can all twelve mutually agree and
we're still wrong?" . . . I think I was more aware of just doing . . . what I
thought, in my heart, was the right thing to do.
Hoffmann, supra note 5, at 1152.
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B. Lessening the Impact of Rule 606(b)
Although appellate review 193 of death penalty sentences is
automatic in all but one of the states allowing capital punish-
ment,194 Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and its comparable state
statutes undermine the validity of appellate procedures with re-
spect to determining whether religious discussion constitutes
prejudicial influence in capital deliberations. When courts halt or,
at a latter stage, deny admission of inquiries into the inner work-
ings of juries, as did the Utah Supreme Court in State v. DeMille,195
the consequences are often disturbingly measurable when they in-
volve capital punishment sentencing deliberations. After all, a de-
fendant's life may depend upon a court's interpretation and related
application of Rule 606(b).
1. Interpretations and Applications
To abide truly by the concept of appellate review as the final
safeguard for determining prejudicial errors committed at the trial
level, 196 judicial interpretations and applications of Rule 606(b)
should consistently account for the threat that religious discussions
often pose in death penalty deliberations. 197 Whereas appellate
courts review capital punishment sentences to determine whether
the jury relied upon passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary fac-
tor, 198 religious discussion usually escapes such labeling. If, by
193. In accordance with Eighth Amendment interpretation, appellate review must include a
determination of whether a death penalty sentence was proportionate to the defendant's per-
sonal culpability or blameworthiness. See People v. Hayes, 564 N.E.2d 803, 829 (fI1. 1990). Pro-
portionality determinations, however, need not extend beyond the facts in a particular case. See
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not require
appeals courts to compare capital cases involving identical convictions in order to determine if a
death sentence is proportionate). While it may be possible to assess proportionality in a given
defendant's case by examining death penalty sentences in isolated contexts, similar detection of
the threat of religious discussion as extraneous material in capital punishment deliberations is
virtually impossible under strict application of Rule 606(b).
194. See HOOD, supra note 13, at 120. Arkansas stands alone in not providing automatic
appellate'review. Id.
195. 756 P.2d 81, 83-84 (Utah 1988).
196. See generally Joseph M. Giarratano, To the Best of Our Knowledge, We Have Never Been
Wrong: Fallibility vs. Finality in Capital Punishment, 100 YALE L.J. 1005 (1991) (outlining the
capital punishment appellate process).
197. See, e.g., DeMille, 756 P.2d at 83-85.
198. The most commonly asserted arbitrary factors are race, gender, ethnicity, indigence,
sympathy for the victim, adverse media publicity, and fear of community response to a lesser
charge. See PALMER, supra note 5, at 146.
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chance, an appellate court recognizes religious discussion amongst
jurors as potentially problematic, Rule 606(b) still lurks formidably
in the background.199
Capital defendants, protected only by insufficient or ineffec-
tive counsel in many unfortunate instances, 200 can rarely voice au-
dible protests. 201 Rather than passively listening for such calls,
however, courts should actively consider religious discussion as ex-
traneous material under Rule 606(b). 20 2 Classifying religious dis-
cussion as extraneous material will not, however, necessarily man-
date a new trial in every case. 20 3 Instead, it would merely result in a
presumption of prejudice, which is already reflected in the defini-
tion of other extraneous contact, communication, or tampering.20 4
2. Policy Implications
An amended interpretation of Rule 606(b), for which this
Note advocates, need only address the threat of religious discussion
as extraneous material in capital punishment deliberations. The
policy justifications underlying Rule 606(b)-jury autonomy and
finality of litigation 20 5-would not suffer in the wake of change ac-
counting for the potentially irreversible consequences stemming
from prejudicial religious discussion among jurors.
On the one hand, including religious discussion in the extra-
neous material exception to Rule 606(b) would not substantially
compromise jury autonomy. During the course of deliberations, an
individual juror would, as always, be able to rely upon her own reli-
gious views, 20 6 without even a modicum of concern about personally
intrusive post-sentencing questions. If a defendant produces suffi-
199. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 14, at 514.
200. See JASPER, supra note 62, at 11 (noting that approximately 90% of prisoners facing
execution cannot afford their own lawyers and, as a result, attorneys working for little or no
compensation are assigned to protect their individual fates).
201. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('Those
whom we would banish from society or from the human community itself often speak in too faint
a voice to be heard above society's demand for punishment." (emphasis added)).
202. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is the particular role of courts to hear these voices,
for the Constitution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the conditions of
social life."); see also supra note 70 (discussing McClesky v. Kemp, particularly Justice Brennan's
dissent).
203. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
204. See id.; cf Mallard v. State, 661 S.W.2d 268, 278 (Tex. App. 1983) (holding that jury dis-
cussion of parole law constituted misconduct, but did not violate defendant's right to a fair and
impartial trial).
205. See supra Part III.
206. See supra note 187.
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cient reason for inquiry under Rule 606(b) regarding the impact of
any religious discussion, then subsequent investigation would focus
solely on intrajury communication during the sentencing phase.
Moreover, the need for inquiry would decrease tremendously with
implementation of both clear jury instructions and procedural safe-
guards that contribute to overall juror comprehension.
20 7
In addition, an amended reading of Rule 606(b) would not
sacrifice the valuable policy goal of finality of litigation. Appellate
courts need only realize that religious discussion, as one factor in
passionate, prejudicial, or arbitrary sentencing, could lead to unjus-
tified imposition of the death penalty. When reviewing capital pun-
ishment cases, appellate courts would thus examine jury delibera-
tions with an additional red flag in mind. Only when deliberations
are truly questionable would further inquiry into the prejudicial
influence of religious discussion be necessary under the exception to
Rule 606(b).
VI. CONCLUSION
"In a society that so strongly affirms the sanctity of life, not
surprisingly the common view is that death is the ultimate sanc-
tion."208 Ours is also a society that strongly affirms every individ-
ual's right to the free exercise of religion. 20 9 When death penalty
deliberations and religious discussion collide, however, the dual
affirmations pose unique problems to the American justice system.
From their respective cells on death row, Kevin Young210 and
Leland DeMille 211 would willingly attest to that. For all its inherent
worth in countless other contexts, religious discussion among jurors
deciding whether a fellow human being should live or die only
serves to undermine capital punishment in general and risk unjus-
tified executions in specific. Tearing down the seemingly impene-
trable walls of Rule 606(b) and recasting the critical dynamic
between judge and jury would serve as important initial steps in
207. See supra Part V.A.
208. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (Brennan, J., concurring).
209. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
210. See Young v. State, 12 P.3d 20 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
211. See State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988).
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clearing the dust that falls throughout our justice system each time
religion and the death penalty collide.
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